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INTRODUCTION

During the 1938 German occupation of Austria, Lea Bondi, an Austrian Jew and art lover, was forced to sell her gallery to a non-Jew under
German “Aryanization” laws. 1 The purchaser, Friedrich Welz, 2 came to her
apartment, saw the Portrait of Wally3 by Egon Schiele hanging on her wall,
and demanded that she give him the painting, despite her protests that it was
part of her private collection and not part of the gallery sale.4 As Welz’s
demands continued, Bondi’s husband reminded her that Welz could prevent
their escape from Austria, and she submitted. 5 Bondi was not compensated
for the painting. 6
Over the next sixty years, the Portrait of Wally came into the possession of several different individuals before ending up in New York City’s
Museum of Modern Art in 1997, on loan from Austria’s Leopold Museum. 7
The United States government seized the painting on behalf of Lea Bondi’s
estate, marking the first use of civil forfeiture on a piece of Nazi-looted art. 8
For more than a decade, New York courts have been challenged with the
task of determining the applicability of civil forfeiture to a case as complicated as United States v. Portrait of Wally. 9
One of the most famous and influential cases of Nazi-looted artwork,
United States v. Portrait of Wally, 10 ended in the summer of 2010 in a highly publicized settlement after more than ten years of litigation in New York
courts. 11 While the full consequences of the litigation are still to be deter-

1. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
2. Welz subsequently became an official member of the Nazi Party. Id. at 238.
3. The Portrait of Wally was painted by Egon Schiele in 1912. The painting portrays Valerie Neuzil, Schiele’s one-time mistress. The Leopold Museum paid a $19 million
settlement for the portrait, a sum that nears the $22.4 million record sum paid for a work by
Schiele. See Emma Allen, At Last, a $19 Million Settlement for Schiele’s Nazi-Looted “Portrait of Wally,” ARTINFO (July 21, 2010), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/35269/at-lasta-19-million-settlement-for-schieles-nazi-looted-portrait-of-wally. The portrait may be
viewed online at, ARTCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.artcyclopedia.org/art/egon-schieleportrait.jpg (last visited December 9, 2011).
4. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 238.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE 226-30 (2003).
8. Id. at 230.
9. Id. at 229-30.
10. See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232.
11. Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y.,
United States Announces $19 Million Settlement in Case of Painting Stolen by Nazi (July
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mined, the final opinion entered in the Portrait of Wally series has shed
some light on the intricacies of civil forfeiture proceedings in Nazi-era restitution cases.
A hybrid of civil and criminal law, civil forfeiture allows victims of
Nazi looting to bolster their claims for restitution with the power and influence of the United States government. 12 It is also making significant
progress toward righting some of the injustices undertaken as a result of the
Holocaust by circumnavigating issues of statutes of limitation and encouraging restitution for long-missing artwork without requiring any specific
wrongdoer to be put on trial. 13 Civil forfeiture gives the best chance of restitution to victims of Nazi looting and should be adopted as the standard in
Nazi-era restitution cases, as it is more in line with due process and affords
victims of Nazi looting better relief than do the causes of action used by the
majority of courts.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of Nazi looting and the
extent to which litigation for the restitution of stolen property still thrives
today. Part III will, first, delve into the doctrinal defenses and legal technicalities that keep plaintiffs from having the chance to present the merits of
their cases to United States courts and, second, discuss the National Stolen
Property Act 14 and the opportunities and obstacles it presents to victims of
Nazi looting. Part IV will explain civil forfeiture generally, compare the
benefits for looting victims under civil forfeiture with those resulting from
the other causes of action, and argue that civil forfeiture should be adopted
as the standard cause of action for cases involving Nazi looting. Part IV will
also address the objections made against civil forfeiture as a method of returning stolen artwork to victims of Nazi looting and dispel these objections
with policy arguments.
II.

HISTORY OF NAZI LOOTING

In a method similar to how Adolph Hitler schemed to eliminate the
Jewish population of Europe, Hitler was determined “to establish Germany
as the world’s dominant cultural center.” 15 Between 1933 and 1945, the
10, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Attorney Press Release] (on file with author), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July10/portraitofwallysettlementpr.pdf.
12. Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Criminal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit
Cultural Property are Ineffective, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 597, 622-23 (2007).
13. Id. at 623.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
15. Shira T. Shapiro, Note, How Republic of Austria v. Altmann and United States
v. Portrait of Wally Relay the Past and Forecast the Future of Nazi Looted-Art Restitution
Litigation, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2008).
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Nazi party took possession of approximately 600,000 pieces of art—
including paintings, sculpture, tapestries—from both museums and private
collections. 16 The number jumps into the millions once rare books, stamps,
coins, and fine furniture are added to the count.17 As Hitler’s power grew,
so did the market for works stolen by Nazis. 18 European and American art
dealers did not hesitate to trade in Nazi-looted artwork. 19 Even works considered to be “degenerate art,” such as works of Jewish artists, modern art
not favored by Hitler, and art representing Jewish subjects, were not destroyed, but sold to obtain valuable foreign currency. 20
Although the Allies helped reunite a number of looted objects with
their original owners after the war, the artwork had changed hands so many
times that determining the true owners of each work was impossible. 21 The
chairman of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, Ronald Laudner,
estimates that more than 100,000 pieces of art, worth at least $10 billion
total, are still missing as a result of Nazi looting. 22 More than sixty years
after the end of World War II, the number of lawsuits for restitution of
looted property is increasing and will inevitably continue to increase. 23
The problem of returning looted artwork to original owners is rooted
in the traditional, though admittedly less than ideal, practices of the art
trade. Buyers and sellers of art often fail to verify the provenance of cultural
property. 24 There are few procedures required by law that aid in the showing of a legitimate chain of title.25 Thus, it is highly common for stolen artwork to “[resurface] on the legitimate market with the purchaser unaware of
its illicit background.” 26
Despite general knowledge that Nazi-looted art is being traded freely
in the art market, many current possessors are hesitant to investigate the
provenance of artwork dating back to World War II or earlier.27 Current
possessors’ hesitation is more likely than not rooted in the fact that such
investigations tend to be very expensive—as well as the fact that conduct16. BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 202.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 203.
20. Id. at 202-03.
21. BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 204.
22. Jessica Grimes, Note, Forgotten Prisoners of War: Returning Nazi-Looted Art
by Relaxing the National Stolen Property Act, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 524
(2010).
23. Id.
24. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Remedies in
Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1199, 1207 (2005).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1200-01.
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ing the investigation could possibly end with the possessor having to turn
over the artwork without receiving compensation.28 Additionally, technicalities of property law can result in multiple parties having good faith,
colorable claims to title.29 It is out of these issues of property law that Naziera restitution cases often arise.
III.

RESTITUTION ROADBLOCKS AND A CLEAR PATH TO REGAINING
POSSESSION OF NAZI-LOOTED ARTWORK

Looking at the history of Nazi-era restitution cases, it may seem at first
glance that United States courts are the last place an original owner would
want to pursue restitution. The basis for dismissal of civil restitution claims
often comes in one of five forms: political question doctrine, international
comity, act of state doctrine, statutes of limitation, or the laches defense.30
The National Stolen Property Act,31 which has significant potential for
gaining victories for victims of Nazi-era looting, complicates proceedings
by requiring criminal mens rea and the very high burden of proof, “beyond
a reasonable doubt.” 32 It is civil forfeiture that allows plaintiffs in Nazi-era
restitution cases the best chance to regain possession of their stolen property, even when issues such as the political question doctrine and statute of
limitations bar restitution, and even when it is difficult to prove subsequent
possessors had the requisite mens rea to satisfy a criminal statute.33 Thus, it
is civil forfeiture that should be adopted as the standard in pursuing relief
from Nazi-era looting.
A.

DOCTRINAL DEFENSES, STATUTES OF LIMITATION, AND THE LACHES
DEFENSE: GREAT BARRIERS TO RESTITUTION

1.

The Foreign Affairs Power and the Political Question Doctrine

Many Nazi-era restitution claims have been dismissed by courts who
have ruled that claims for war reparations, according to the political question doctrine, are the sole domain of the United States government. 34 While

28. Id. at 1200-01.
29. Kreder, supra note 24, at 1205.
30. See Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting
Litigation to Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 193, 213-24 (2006).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
32. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 612.
33. See Kreder, supra note 24, at 1233-34.
34. Pollock, supra note 30, at 214 (citing Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, Inc., 129 F. Supp.
2d 370, 376 (D. N.J. 2001) (“Claims for war reparations arising out of World War II have
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courts continue to dismiss Nazi-era restitution cases on foreign policy
grounds, the Southern District of New York has held that “adjudication of
[ownership] claims is squarely within the parameters of what is entrusted to
the judiciary.” 35
These cases have also been dismissed because of the potential embarrassment judicial review would cause for the political branches, as well as
the potential for showing a lack of respect for the political branches’ power
to make these decisions. 36 It has been argued that “[b]ecause the political
branches have not resolved many potential claims of looted art, there is
little danger of disrespect or embarrassment if a court were to adjudicate
them.” 37 Yet, courts continue to dismiss Nazi-era restitution cases on the
grounds of potential embarrassment and lack of respect. 38
2.

International Comity

Courts also continue to dismiss Nazi-era restitution claims on the
grounds of international comity, which prohibits United States courts “from
examining the legitimacy of actions taken by another government in its
[own] territory.” 39 The principle of international comity is not codified in
law, so U.S. law may trump a comity argument in the event that the two
conflict. 40 United States courts have used the doctrine of international comity to avoid examining the merits of Nazi-era restitution claims, 41 but the
doctrine should only be applied when there exist foreign or international
laws to which the United States courts may defer. 42
In Portrait of Wally, the Leopold Museum argued that the court was
required to abstain from adjudicating the issue and defer to the authority of
the Austrian restitution system, which the museum argued had a larger stake
in the case. 43 The court disagreed, finding that the museum did not identify
any action, proceeding, or decree of the Austrian government to which
always been managed on a governmental level . . . .”)). However, “many looted art cases do
not fall within [the category of war reparations].” Pollock, supra note 30, at 214-15.
35. United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002).
36. Pollock, supra note 30, at 215.
37. Id. at 215-16.
38. See id. at 216.
39. Id. at 218-19 (quoting In re Nazi-era Cases Against German Defendants Litig.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 387 (D.N.J. 2001)).
40. Id. at 219.
41. See, e.g., In re Nazi-era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 213 F. Supp.
2d 439, 447 n.11 (D.N.J. 2002). The court aimed “to make it absolutely clear that it will not
entertain any independent actions directed to the conduct of the [German] Foundation.” Id.
42. Pollock, supra note 30, at 219.
43. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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United States courts should defer, that the Austrian courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Holocaust-era property claims, and that there had
not been any formal or purposeful act of the Austrian government regarding
the case that would implicate international comity. 44 Thus, in order for a
court to defer adjudication to another nation’s government or judiciary,
there must be some concrete action or law to which the court can grant deference. 45
3.

The Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine is another tool employed by United States
courts to dismiss Nazi-era restitution claims. 46 The act of state doctrine allows courts to give deference to acts of foreign states such that “the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another.” 47 Unlike international comity, the act of state doctrine is “not
some vague doctrine of abstention but a ‘principle of decision’” 48—“‘a
federal choice of law rule,’ rather than a question of immunity or justiciability.” 49
Courts faced with some Nazi-era restitution suits have dismissed these
claims on the basis that movements toward reparations made after World
War II are to be considered sovereign acts of the current German government. 50 However, some argue that courts deciding Nazi-era restitution cases
should hesitate to apply the act of state doctrine, even when it is technically
applicable, especially when the sovereign act in question is “closely associated with the atrocities of [World War II].” 51
44. Id. The court also cited the United States’ “strong interest in enforcing its own
laws as applied to conduct on its own soil.” Id.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Wolf v. Fed. Republic of Germany, No. 93 C 7499, 1995 WL 263471,
at *14 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1995).
47. Pollock, supra note 30, at 220 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,
252 (1897)).
48. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964)).
49. Id. (citing Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts
in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2138 (1995) (stating that most
courts utilizing the act of state doctrine “choose[] to apply the foreign state’s law rather than
international or United States law”)).
50. See id. at 221 (referencing Wolf v. Fed. Republic of Germany, No. 93 C 7499,
1995 WL 263471, at *14 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1995) (declining to “revisit Germany’s decisions
not to pay Wolf reparations”)).
51. Id. (quoting Altmann v. Republic of Austria (Altmann II), 317 F.3d 954, 965
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)). See also United States v.
Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
2002) (declining to invoke the act of state doctrine before even considering whether the
“act” or “state” elements were met).
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In the Portrait of Wally case, the Leopold Museum asked the court to
use the act of state doctrine to disregard three rulings by the Austrian government that were detrimental to the museum’s case. 52 The court declined to
disregard the Austrian rulings, holding that the court was not being asked to
invalidate the rulings, but only to determine the effects of the rulings on
Wally’s ownership. 53 Thus, the act of state doctrine does not prevent United
States courts from interpreting the laws of other states as part of the legal
analysis of a case—it only prevents United States courts from making rulings that undo the effect of another nation’s own laws or rulings. 54
4.

Statutes of Limitation

Even once a Nazi-era restitution claim makes it into a United States
court, the jurisdiction’s statute of limitations rules can bar an original owner’s chance at regaining possession. 55 In most cases, whether the court applies the discovery rule, 56 the demand and refusal rule, 57 or the due diligence rule, 58 the statute of limitations is “often the greatest barrier to Holocaust plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.” 59 This is especially true as “holders of
stolen art treasures often operate under the assumption that, if secrecy is

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id.
See id.
Pollock, supra note 30, at 224-25.
In applying the discovery rule, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations on an action for replevin begins to run when the owner knows or reasonably should know of
his cause of action and the identity of the possessor of the chattel. Subsequent transfers of the chattel are part of the continuous dispossession
of the chattel from the original owner. The important point is not that
there has been a substitution of possessors, but that there has been a continuous dispossession of the former owner.
O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 874 (N.J. 1980).
57. Under the demand and refusal rule, “a cause of action for replevin against the
good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes a demand for
return of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it.” Solomon
R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 317-18 (N.Y. 1991).
58. Under the due diligence rule, “[b]y diligently pursuing their goods, owners may
prevent the statute of limitations from running. The meaning of due diligence will vary with
the facts of each case, including the nature and value of the personal property.” O’Keeffe,
416 A.2d at 873.
59. Pollock, supra note 30, at 225 (quoting Kelly Ann Falconer, Comment, When
Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally Binding International Agreement Regarding
Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 383, 408 (2000)).
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maintained for a long enough time, the statute of limitations will ultimately
protect them.” 60
However, the use of civil forfeiture as a means of recovering Nazilooted property eliminates the relevancy of when the art was stolen, as it
creates a new statutory period depending on when the stolen property
crossed state or national lines. 61 Civil forfeiture’s effect on statutes of limitation is addressed later in this Comment. 62
5.

The Laches Defense

Some states, like New York, do not require that a plaintiff initiating a
claim of replevin show evidence that they acted with due diligence in attempting to recover their stolen property. 63 The plaintiff’s due diligence,
however, may be relevant to the defendant’s use of the laches defense. 64
This defense is applied “where it is clear that a plaintiff unreasonably delayed in initiating an action and a defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the
delay.” 65 In cases of restitution of stolen cultural objects, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has protected the good
faith purchaser from dispossession, explaining that the laches defense “safeguards the interests of a good faith purchaser of lost or stolen art . . . by
weighing in the balance of competing interests the owner’s diligence in
pursuing his claim.” 66
In Portrait of Wally, 67 the Leopold Museum sought to assert the defense of laches in order to bar the civil forfeiture action, arguing that neither
Bondi, the original owner of the Wally painting, nor her heirs, attempted to
regain possession of the painting in the forty years between the last letter
from Bondi’s attorney to the museum’s proprietor and the painting’s impor60. Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 657, 658-59 (1998).
61. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 623.
62. Please refer to subsections IV(B)(2) and IV(C)(1) of this Comment for arguments surrounding civil forfeiture’s effect on statutes of limitation.
63. Susan E. Brabenec, Note, The Art of Determining “Stolen Property:” United
States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1369, 1381 (2001).
64. See, e.g., Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98
Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999). See also
United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
65. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at
*24 (quoting Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
66. See Brabenec, supra note 63, at 1383 (quoting Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *24).
67. See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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tation to New York. 68 The museum argued that “its ability to defend against
forfeiture has been substantially prejudiced by this delay because many
witnesses to the events at issue” had been long dead.69 The court held, however, that the Leopold Museum had not provided any legal basis for a laches defense against the government, nor had the museum offered any authority indicating that the laches defense can even be applied to a civil forfeiture action. 70 In fact, “Supreme Court precedent makes this a dubious proposition.” 71 In Nazi-era looting cases, it is clear why a civil forfeiture action
may be the best chance an original owner of stolen artwork has to gain restitution, as it is the federal government that the defendant would claim the
defense of laches against—not the original owner—and, thus, the timeliness
of the original owner’s actions are not relevant. 72
B.

THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT

The National Stolen Property Act 73 is a criminal statute under which
time in jail or fines may be imposed as a penalty for transporting stolen
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 275.
71. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (quoting United States v. Summerlin,
310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (“It is well settled that the United States is not . . . subject to the
defense of laches in enforcing its rights.”)).
72. See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006). The language of § 2314 is as follows:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value
of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or
taken by fraud; or
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or causes to be
transported, or induces any person or persons to travel in, or to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce in the execution or concealment
of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person or those persons of money
or property having a value of $5,000 or more; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made,
forged,
altered,
or
counterfeited;
or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any traveler's check bearing a forged countersignature;
or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce, any tool, implement, or thing used or fitted to be
used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security
or
tax
stamps,
or
any
part
thereof--
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goods across state or national lines. 74 The Act “establishes a felony offense
for those who knowingly sell, transport, receive, or conceal goods whose
value exceeds $5,000 in interstate or foreign commerce.” 75 A violation of
the National Stolen Property Act consists of three elements: (1) the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of property, (2) valued at $5,000
or more, (3) with knowledge that the property was stolen, converted, or
taken by fraud. 76
The National Stolen Property Act can be used to regain possession of
looted artwork, especially in cases such as Portrait of Wally, in which foreign museums possessing looted artwork loan the pieces to American museums. 77 The element of knowledge, however, “can be extremely difficult
to establish in the context of cultural property because of the shroud of
secrecy surrounding art and antiquities transactions.” 78 Thus, in the case of
Nazi-looted art objects, which undoubtedly have changed hands numerous
times before crossing state lines, this element can be the difference between
winning and losing. 79
1.

Determining Mens Rea Based on Defendant’s Actions

United States v. Hollinshead 80 was the first case to apply the National
Stolen Property Act to cultural property. 81 American archaeologists were
charged in conspiracy to transport stolen goods across state lines.82 The
nation of Guatemala had passed a law nationalizing Mayan antiques found
within the country and asserted ownership over these artifacts. 83 One of the
defendants, Hollinshead, cut a Guatemalan stele, which was discovered in a
site of Mayan ruins, into pieces and shipped the objects to himself in California in a box marked “personal effects.” 84 The court held that “bribing
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
Under § 2315 of the National Stolen Property Act, the same penalties are imposed onto
persons who either sell or receive any of the aforementioned objects with knowledge of the
objects’ stolen, converted, forged, counterfeited, falsely made or altered status. See 18
U.S.C. § 2315 (2006).
74. Fincham, supra note 12, at 611. Thus, the commission of the crime is not the
stealing of the property, but the transportation of stolen property. Id.
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
77. See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
78. Fincham, supra note 12, at 611-12.
79. See id.
80. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 612.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 613.
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officials, cutting the [stele] into easily disguised pieces[,] and using false
information on the packaging showed beyond a reasonable doubt that [the
defendants] knew they were transporting stolen property into the United
States.” 85
In Hollinshead, 86 the defendants’ mens rea was relatively easy to determine under the National Stolen Property Act, 87 as the people who stole
the stele were the same people who attempted to bring the stolen object
across state lines. 88 In cases like Portrait of Wally, although the court easily
finds that the painting was stolen from Bondi, the original owner, the difficulty in obtaining a criminal conviction is in showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Museum of Modern Art knew that the painting was stolen
when it brought the painting into the United States on loan from Austria’s
Leopold Museum. 89
Establishing the mens rea of a defendant can also prove difficult when
the cultural objects were taken in a country where the law governing the
dispossession differs from that of the United States. The defendants in
United States v. McClain 90 were convicted under the National Stolen Property Act 91 for stealing pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico and transporting them into the United States for sale. 92 In doing so, the defendants gave
the Mexican Archaeological Institute false papers in an effort to give the
artifacts clean provenance.93 The defendants then transported the artifacts
across the border into California to be sold. 94 The conviction was overturned because the court deemed the Mexican law establishing national
ownership to be an “unclear pronouncement[] by a foreign legislature.” 95
Thus, although the United States government wants to give deference to the
laws of cultural objects’ source nations, sometimes the law is so vague or
confusing that to impose criminal liability would go against the jurisprudential standards of the United States.96

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
2009).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154.
See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 271 (S.D.N.Y.
United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
See Fincham, supra note 12, at 614.
Id.
Id. at 614-15.
McClain, 593 F.2d at 671.
See Fincham, supra note 12, at 615.
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Determining Mens Rea When Objects Were Stolen in a Country with
Differing Laws

United States v. McClain 97 exemplifies a problem of ascertaining a defendant’s mens rea under the National Stolen Property Act—determining
whether the defendant had the requisite mens rea for a criminal conviction
under the law of the art object’s nation of origin. 98 Just as many nations
have established laws asserting ownership over their cultural property, the
nations involved with World War II have all established legislation to deal
with the effects of the war. 99 United States courts must tread cautiously in
interpreting foreign law in the proceedings of United States criminal cases
in order to preserve due process rights for both the victims and the defendants, as an object that seems to be stolen in the United States may not actually have been stolen under the laws of the nation of origin. 100 However,
just as some courts have conceded that “when necessary, our courts are
capable of evaluating foreign patrimony laws[,]” 101 the United States courts
should also be able to evaluate foreign restitution laws to aid in reestablishing possession of valuable looted objects in original owners.102
IV.

CIVIL FORFEITURE: THE SAVING GRACE OF NAZI-ERA RESTITUTION
CASES

For the original owners of Nazi-looted artwork attempting to regain
possession of their prized objects, civil forfeiture is the best chance for the
restitution of their stolen property and should become the standard cause of
action in Nazi-era restitution cases. Civil forfeiture is the most beneficial
course of action for victims of Nazi looting, as it bears significant advantages over pressing charges in a criminal trial under the National Stolen
Property Act or pursuing restitution in an independent civil proceeding.
Unfortunately, civil forfeiture has been criticized for its apparent ignorance
of due process, as well as its potential for government interference with the
legal system. This section will argue that civil forfeiture is the best method
for gaining restitution by explaining civil forfeiture generally, outlining the
beneficial characteristics of civil forfeiture as a means of gaining restitu-

97. McClain, 593 F.2d 658.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). For example, Austria established its Restitution Commission to attempt to reinstate
possession of looted objects to Austrian Jews. See id.
100. See McClain, 593 F.2d at 671.
101. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 410 (2d Cir. 2003).
102. See id.
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tion, and by both addressing and dispelling the due process concerns of
critics of civil forfeiture of Nazi-looted artwork.
A.

A USEFUL HYBRID OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW

Civil forfeiture, when used in conjunction with the broad scope of the
National Stolen Property Act, is the best opportunity a victim of Nazi looting has to regain possession of stolen art objects. 103 A hybrid of criminal
and civil proceedings, civil forfeiture has no specific basis in statute—each
federal crime has its own forfeiture provision. 104 “A civil forfeiture proceeding is initiated by the government’s filing of a complaint that names a
specific object as the defendant, as opposed to a person who may have
committed a crime to obtain the property.” 105 The object in question is
seized by the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
or another appropriate federal agency before the U.S. Attorney initiates a
civil proceeding. 106 The proceeding continues like a typical civil trial, except that any person or entity with a legal interest in the property can contest its forfeiture and are entitled to a jury trial to determine the property’s
legal ownership. 107
In proceedings for the restitution of Nazi-looted artwork, civil forfeiture is usually, and most effectively, used in conjunction with the National
Stolen Property Act. 108 In these cases, a stolen object must be transported,
imported, or received in violation of the statute. 109 Each time the object is
transported, imported, or received in violation of the statute, a new statute
of limitations period begins—thus, the most recent violation governs the
statutory period for forfeiture. 110 Once the government seizes the artwork, it
must “show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the artwork is subject
to forfeiture because it was imported, transported, or received in violation
of [the National Stolen Property Act].” 111
In the forfeiture proceeding, the government does not need to put the
wrongdoer on trial, but only needs to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that a crime occurred and that the object in question was involved in that
crime in order to prevail.112 “Those who claim ownership of the art—
regardless of whether they possessed it immediately prior to the seizure—
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Kreder, supra note 24, at 1204-05.
See Fincham, supra note 12, at 622.
Kreder, supra note 24, at 1222-23.
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
Fincham, supra note 12, at 611.
See id. at 623.
Kreder, supra note 24, at 1204.
Id. at 1223.
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may assert that the art should not be forfeited to the government, but rather
should be awarded to them.” 113
B.

THE BENEFITS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS

Civil forfeiture can be the saving grace of Nazi-era restitution cases, as
the nature of civil forfeiture circumvents the technicalities that often bar
claims from victims of Nazi looting. 114 Civil forfeiture should become the
standard cause of action for original owners of looted artwork, as civil forfeiture proceedings require a lower burden of proof than a criminal proceeding, 115 allow for older claims based on the National Stolen Property
Act’s method of determining statutes of limitation, 116 and bolster plaintiff’s
claims with abilities of the United States government. 117
1.

Requires a Lower Burden of Proof Than Pure Criminal Proceedings

First, although the passage of time wipes away evidence that may help
to convict a thief, transporter, or seller of Nazi-looted artwork in a criminal
proceeding under the National Stolen Property Act, civil forfeiture allows
for a lower burden of proof and a better chance of restitution.118 Attempting
to recover stolen cultural property under the National Stolen Property Act
alone requires the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, but civil forfeiture
allows these types of cases to proceed under the laws of the National Stolen
Property Act with only a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.119 As
recently as 1999, the government needed only to show probable cause of an
unlawful act involving the stolen object, but with the advent of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 120 safeguards were put into place to
ensure that the current possessor of the object, whether he or she is a good
faith purchaser, is not dispossessed of the object without due process. 121
Along the same lines, an original owner of Nazi-looted artwork can
pursue restitution through civil forfeiture even if he or she does not know of
113. Id. at 1205.
114. Id. at 1233-34.
115. See id. at 1204.
116. See Kreder, supra note 24 at 1234-35.
117. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 623.
118. See Kreder, supra note 24, at 1204.
119. See id.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2010).
121. See Kreder, supra note 24, at 1232. CAFRA establishes an innocent-owner
defense that prevents innocent owners from losing their property under any civil forfeiture
statute. Id. An innocent owner is a person who, “(i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for
value; and (ii) did not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the property
was subject to forfeiture.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).
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a specific person who stole his or her property, or if the wrongdoer is missing or has passed away. 122 Because the government only needs to prove that
a crime occurred, but does not need to put a specific offender on trial, evidentiary problems are much easier to bypass.123 Thus, civil forfeiture can be
used to penalize defendants in cases in which the defendant’s bad actions do
not call for a criminal conviction. 124 This characteristic of civil forfeiture
proceedings is especially beneficial in Nazi-era restitution cases, such as
Portrait of Wally, in which the looted artwork has changed hands so many
times over the years and the initial wrongdoer was long out of the picture. 125 By pursuing civil forfeiture as opposed to undertaking a criminal
conviction or a civil claim of replevin, an original owner of Nazi-looted
artwork has the ability to gain restitution, even if the original owner cannot
name the specific person who wrongfully took the artwork from his or her
possession. 126
2.

Allows for Older Claims

Applied in conjunction with the National Stolen Property Act, civil
forfeiture also allows the government to overcome issues of statutes of limitation. 127 “[S]tatutes of limitation issues in traditional civil litigation often
favor the defendant when the defendant has possessed the artwork for a
long time.” 128 This is particularly true in cases where the artwork was purchased in a country with civil laws protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers. 129 However, when original owners of looted artwork seek restitution in a civil forfeiture proceeding under the National Stolen Property Act,
the statutory period begins at the stolen property’s most recent crossing of
state or national lines—instead of beginning when the object was originally
stolen. 130 Thus, notions of adverse possession 131 do not stand in the way of
an original owner regaining his or her looted artwork. 132
122. See Kreder, supra note, 24 at 1223.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1234.
125. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237-46 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
126. See id.
127. Kreder, supra note 24, at 1233.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 623.
131. Adverse possession is the running of the statute of limitation on a claim for
replevin, in which the possessor of a converted object may gain colorable title to that object.
See Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920). The court states:
There are five essential elements necessary to constitute an effective adverse possession: First, the possession must be hostile and under claim
of right; second, it must be actual; third, it must be open and notorious;
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Some opponents of civil forfeiture as a means of restitution for Nazilooted artwork criticize civil forfeiture as a violation of due process because
of the use of the National Stolen Property Act’s ability to determine a more
recent statutory limitation period.133 However, the typical statute of limitation “generally only bars the remedy of direct action for affirmative relief.” 134 That is, the limitation only “extinguishes the remedial action, but
not the underlying right” to undertake an action.135 This underlying right is
still available to serve as the basis for remedies other than the direct action
barred by the statute.136
The purpose of statutes of limitation is not to protect wrongdoers or
provide wrongdoers with “peace of mind regarding potential liability.” 137
Statutes of limitation are meant to prevent stale claims for which lost evidence and faded memories pose a constraint on the fair adjudication of the
claims. 138 Statutes of limitation are meant to ensure that evidence is not
outdated and that those with firsthand knowledge are still available to testify. 139 However, many cases of Nazi-looted artwork are not stale claims
since much of the evidence has only been discovered recently, as
“[g]overnment records regarding the whereabouts of these works of art are
only recently being unsealed and scrutinized, despite the fact that the thefts
occurred during World War II.” 140 Thus, bringing criminal charges or a
claim of replevin, which would bar looting victims’ claims as a result of the
running of the statutory period, withholds relief from these victims unnecessarily. 141 Civil forfeiture should become the standard in pursuing restitution for victims of Nazi-looting, as it allows for victims to gain relief without the arbitrary application of a long-gone statutory period.

Id.

fourth, it must be exclusive; and fifth, it must be continuous. If any of
these constituents is wanting, the possession will not effect a bar of the
legal title.

132. See id.
133. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the statute of limitation argument against civil
forfeiture).
134. Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law–Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (1950).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 461 (1999).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
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Bolsters Original Owners’ Claims with the Abilities of the Government

There are also significant benefits to original owners when their restitution cases are undertaken by the government. 142 Often, original owners do
not have the resources to bring a civil claim against current possessors of
their Nazi-looted artwork. 143 With civil forfeiture, restitution proceedings
are backed by the government and all of the financial and investigative resources it has to offer. 144
The government also has the power to bring criminal charges in conjunction with the civil forfeiture proceedings, which can lead to a quick
settlement by increasing pressure on the current possessor of looted artwork. 145 It is also significantly easier for the government to seize the cultural object in question. 146 The government must only show probable cause in
order to gain possession of a looted object, while a civil claimant would
need to show “irreparable harm[ ] and a likelihood of success on the merits
to obtain a temporary federal injunction.”147 Thus, civil forfeiture proceedings allow civil claimants to earn a greater chance of success against individuals and well-known museums alike.
C.

DUE PROCESS OBJECTIONS AND THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS THAT TRUMP
THEM

Criticism of civil forfeiture as a means for remedy to victims of Nazilooting comes hand-in-hand with criticism of the restitution movement as a
whole. 148 Those who criticize civil forfeiture tend to do so on the basis that
it too easily grants original owners restitution of looted artworks. These
opponents cite the ease with which civil forfeiture allows for the circumventing of statute of limitations, the chilling effect civil forfeiture has on the
art industry, and the burden it puts on bona fide purchasers who have no
knowledge of the artwork’s looted status as reasons for their dispositions. 149
This section will explain these objections to civil forfeiture, address the
policy reasons for dispelling them, and explain why civil forfeiture is more
in line with due process than any other cause of action in pursuing restitution of Nazi-looted artwork.
142. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 623.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 624.
147. Fincham, supra note 12, at 624.
148. See infra Part IV.C.1-3 (discussing the criticism of the use of civil forfeiture in
such cases).
149. Id.
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Circumventing Statutes of Limitation Violates Due Process

The return of looted artwork to original owners is often the object of
opposition, as many believe that traditional application of the statute of
limitation on these claims should bar restitution, despite the hardship endured during World War II. 150 Sir Norman Rosenthal, a child of Jewish refugees during the Holocaust, has expressed the views held by many opposing the restitution movement. 151 Those who lost art collections were generally wealthy, he argues, and the majority of those wronged during World
War II do not “have art treasures that their children and grandchildren can
now claim as compensation.” 152 Rosenthal argues that the restitution
movement is a “market-driven hypocrisy” that blows out of proportion the
losses of the wealthy few in order to “drum up trade [of Nazi-era art.]” 153
Thus, Rosenthal argues there must be a statute of limitation barring restitution of Nazi-looted art. In support of this assertion, he states:
The world should let go of the past and live in the present.
Of course, the best of the past needs to be looked after, but
we should not be overly obsessive about the worst of the
past—it is not useful either to individuals or society as a
whole. Each person should invent him or herself creatively
in the present, and not on the back of the lost wealth of ancestors. 154
However, those who criticize the restitution movement often feel that
those seeking repossession, usually the heirs of the original owners, are
doing so in hopes of receiving a financial benefit.155 In reality, most claimants’ initial decision to make a claim is often not at all based on monetary
desire, but deep emotion. 156 Seeking restitution becomes “‘an almost sacred
duty’” to some claimants who have promised their parents or grandparents
150. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and
Holocaust-Era Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the
Public Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37, 42 (2009).
151. Id. at 43.
152. Id. (quoting Sir Norman Rosenthal, Editorial, The Time Has Come for a Statute
NEWSPAPER,
Dec.
2008,
at
30,
available
at
of
Limitations,
ART
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=16627).
153. Id. (quoting Sir Norman Rosenthal, Editorial, The Time Has Come for a Statute
NEWSPAPER,
Dec.
2008,
at
30,
available
at
of
Limitations,
ART
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=16627).
154. Id.
155. See Kreder, supra note 150, at 43-44.
156. Id. (citing Constance Lowenthal, Recovering Looted Jewish Cultural Property,
in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 139, 139 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration ed., 2004)).
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that they would pursue recovery. 157 Many also believe “that the recovery of
property, particularly that which demonstrates the education and taste of
their forebears, allows present and future generations to connect to an ancestral world that was disrupted and destroyed by Hitler.”158 Ultimately, restoring possession of looted artwork to original owners is a matter of moral
justice and memory: “Our chance to do today that which we will not be able
to do even a few years from now—to gather all the pieces of the puzzle.” 159
Civil forfeiture should be adopted as the standard for pursuing restitution in
Nazi-era looting claims, as it will most effectively allow family members to
fulfill their honorable duties toward their loved ones who suffered as a result of the actions of the Nazi Party.
2.

Civil Forfeiture Creates a Chilling Effect on the International Art
Trade and Museum Industry

Other objections to the use of civil forfeiture as a tool for encouraging
restitution of Nazi-looted artwork come from members of the art community who argue that granting claimants more ease in restitution proceedings
puts a chilling effect on the trade of art, as well as international art loans
among museums. 160 Following the seizure of the Portrait of Wally from the
Museum of Modern Art in New York, art adviser Ashton Hawkins stated,
I think that people who would have previously considered
lending now simply don’t consider it . . . . I know from my
colleagues who arrange these exhibitions in New York and
in other cities that lending to the United States . . . has been
more of a problem than it used to be.161
Some proponents of protecting the art trade from the apparent burden
of verifying title justify the protection of artwork from seizure by emphasizing “the invaluable attributes of the artworks themselves.” 162 One proponent
of protecting artwork from seizure wrote, “Art enhances the human expe157. Id. at 44 (quoting Constance Lowenthal, Recovering Looted Jewish Cultural
Property, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 139, 139 (Int’l Bureau of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2004)).
158. Kreder, supra note 150, at 44.
159. Hector Feliciano, Nazi Plunder: Seeking Moral Justice by the Return of Looted
Art, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998, at M1.
160. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 626.
161. Id. (quoting David D’Arcy, MoMA in Battle over Painting Seized by Nazis,
ALL
THINGS
CONSIDERED
(December
27,
2004),
available
at
NPR
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4246589).
162. See, e.g., Ronen Sarraf, Note, The Value of Borrowed Art, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
729, 741 (1999).
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rience by providing examples of humanity’s greatest achievements; it offers
testimony . . . to the diversity and scope of our species; and, it provides a
tangible means of identifying with one’s past.”163 Each piece of artwork is a
trove of historic and cultural information that can enrich its viewers in innumerable ways. 164 “Thus, the exchange of artworks increases the visibility
of these sources of knowledge and benefits the public greatly. Taken to its
intellectual extreme, the exhibition of even stolen art may be justified.” 165
Even with the advent of the restitution movement, and “[d]espite fears
that this process would lead to the emptying of museum storerooms and
display cases,” Dr. James Cuno, the former director of the Harvard Art Museums, claims that there have not been many actual restitutions of looted
artwork to their original owners. 166 As of February 2002, only about one
thousand out of fourteen million of the art objects exhibited in United States
museums have “questionable gaps in their provenance.” 167 Of those approximate one thousand pieces of art, only eight have been claimed by original
owners, and of those eight, three of them remain on display—the other five
having been returned to the possession of original owners or their heirs. 168
As of February 2002, only twelve claims have been brought against American museums, resulting in only four works of art being returned to the claimants, with eight remaining in museum collections.169
Furthermore, the concept of allowing good faith owners to quietly enjoy possession of stolen artwork creates even more of a problem when applied to museums in their role of trust in society. 170 “Considering the high
ethical standards to which museums must hold themselves,” wrote one proponent of provenance investigation, “a standard that goes beyond the mere
avoidance of illegality but rather to the maintenance of their integrity and
furtherance of the public’s trust, no museum would knowingly display stolen artwork.” 171 Theoretically, no museum would want to suffer the shame
that would likely arise as a result of borrowing, owning, or displaying art
with knowledge that it may be stolen.172 The importance of determining
whether a piece of art is stolen is vital when attempting to decide whether to
exhibit the artwork; this applies whether the object is part of a temporary
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and
the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409,
438 (2003).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 438-39.
170. See Sarraf, supra note 162, at 743.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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display, or whether it is intended to be a permanent part of the museum’s
collection—in which case some would say the duty applies even more. 173
In Nazi-era restitution cases, it is foreseeable that the public may be
forced to give up the ability to view and enjoy valuable pieces of artwork. 174 However, “justice and public trust in the sanctity of museums
command restitution of looted art.” 175 As a response to critics such as Rosenthal, it has been argued that “‘[t]he public interest must surely be in
upholding the rule of law, rather than promoting an international free-for-all
through the unrestricted circulation of tainted works of art.’” 176
Refusing to allow redress to original owners by giving superior title to
current possessors would “maximize the marketability of stolen art . . . .” 177
There would be no incentives for buyers and sellers of artwork to investigate title, “and stolen art would move through the marketplace at a much
faster pace.” 178 Some opponents of civil forfeiture as a means for restitution
would argue that it is the goal of the law to promote free trade of goods and
marketplace stability. 179 However, the law should, instead, strive to increase
the marketability of artwork by encouraging buyers to investigate title, such
that buyers will not hesitate to purchase art in fear that they are not acquiring good title. 180 In other words, if there are no questions about whether a
sale actually results in colorable title, there are no obstacles to sale, and the
market will function efficiently. 181
Supporters of the restitution movement challenge critics by asking,
“Do we really wish to educate our children to have no respect for history,
legality and ethical values by providing museums with the opportunity freely to exhibit stolen property?” 182 Increasingly, it appears that the art community, as well as the United States government, is beginning to reconcile
with the idea that statutes of limitation should not be the justification for
dismissing otherwise valid claims for the restitution of looted artwork, especially in cases where a museum is holding looted artwork in the public
trust. 183
173. See id.
174. See Kreder, supra note 150, at 45.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Leon Symons, No Time Limit for Art Claims, JEWISH CHRON. (London), Dec. 18, 2008, at 3, available at http://www.thejc.com/articles/no-time-limit-artclaims).
177. Cuba, supra note 137, at 464.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 464-65.
182. See Kreder, supra note 150, at 45 (quoting Stolen Art Works, SUNDAY TIMES
(U.K.), Nov. 28, 2006, at 18).
183. See id. at 41.
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The United States joined with forty-three other nations in signing the
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art in December
1998. 184 The Washington Principles “‘called on museums, governments,
commercial galleries, and auction houses to cooperate in tracing looted
artwork through more stringent research into the provenance of every item’
and ‘provide[d] international attention and legitimacy to the return of [Nazilooted] artwork.’” 185 Despite the international effort to reach “‘just and
fair’” 186 solutions, the Washington Principles are not binding on those nations who have signed on, and there is still opposition to the return of art
from museums to original owners. 187 The intentions of the government, as
well as the art world, to aid in relieving the victims of Nazi looting are
clear. The adoption of civil forfeiture as the standard for Nazi-era looting
cases can only further the intent of both groups to aid in correction of the
injustices of the Holocaust.
3.

Civil Forfeiture is Burdensome on Bona Fide Purchasers of Looted
Artwork

Civil forfeiture is also criticized for being burdensome to the innocent
purchasers of Nazi-looted artwork, as they are often the ones who tend to be
dispossessed as a result of restitution proceedings. 188 Some critics argue
that United States prosecutors should limit forfeiture proceedings to cases
in which the art object to be forfeited appears to have been stolen recently,
or when there appears to be a pattern of abuse by the violator.189 To do otherwise would be to favor the rights of the claimants above the rights of the
innocent purchasers. 190

184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor,
and the Unfinished Business of World War II, 198-99 (Pub. Affairs 2003)) (alteration in
original).
186. Kreder, supra note 150, at 42 (quoting Am. Ass’n of Museums, Guidelines
Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, §§ 1-3 (amended
Apr. 2001), available at http://aam-us.org/musuemresources/ethics/nazi_guidelines.cfm).
If the pre-war owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not
subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously
to achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case. See U.S. State Dep’t, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets Proceedings
971,
971
(1998),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heacappen.pdf.
187. See Kreder, supra note 150.
188. See Fincham, supra note 12, at 632.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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Some argue that the eventual shift, “in favor of theft victims suggests
that current rules protecting buyers of art and other chattels are unsatisfactory.” 191 One argument supporting this shift is that protecting the sale of
stolen artwork encourages theft. 192 If the statute of limitation limits the
amount of time in which an original owner can lay claim to stolen artwork,
buyers are less likely to undertake a provenance search to determine whether they are obtaining good title to an art object. 193 Thus, “[b]uyers often rely
on a gallery’s reputation [when purchasing art,] without requesting any other evidence of title.” 194
However, “[e]ven reputable auction houses such as Sotheby’s have
been known not to investigate title,” 195 so it should be up to the law to
create incentives for buyers to ensure that they are not purchasing stolen
artwork and investigate provenance. 196 Because purchasers have the opportunity to investigate provenance, if a purchaser chooses to take a chance
and skip the investigation, he or she should also take a chance with the possibility that the artwork will be returned to its original owner without compensation. 197
Some have argued that requiring sellers and buyers of artwork to conduct title and provenance searches would place too much of a burden on
any good faith possessor. 198 Thus, only potential new purchasers should be
responsible for conducting an investigation into the authenticity and provenance of the artwork in question. 199 However, this argument fails, as it places a large burden on potential buyers while allowing current possessors, “to
quietly continue to retain title wrongfully.”200
To require current possessors and potential new buyers to conduct investigations and establish good title, “is as much for the benefit of the possessor as it is for the true owner.” 201 Without requiring due diligence investigation, current possessors are unprotected from any claims that may arise,
and, “once a claim is made, the burden of proving good title and right to
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possession rests inequitably on the shoulders of the plaintiff.” 202 Proponents
of requiring a due diligence investigation argue that this imposes too high
of a burden on both the current possessor and the true owner of the artwork. 203 Thus, requiring current and potential possessors to undertake such
an investigation would reduce or eliminate any potential burden imposed
upon good faith buyers by the application of civil forfeiture in cases of Nazi-looted artwork. 204
Despite arguments against protecting bona fide purchasers, there are
due process safeguards in place to help protect them from being dispossessed of the artwork by civil forfeiture. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act (CAFRA) 205 establishes a new innocent owner defense, which imposes
on the current possessor the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that
the object in question was subject to forfeiture. 206 CAFRA defines an “innocent owner” as one
who obtains an interest in property after the conduct giving
rise to the forfeiture has occurred as a person who, at the
time of acquiring the interest in the property “(i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for value; and (ii) did not know
and was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.” 207
Thus, civil forfeiture still allows original owners of Nazi-looted artwork a
heightened chance at restitution without disregarding the rights of bona fide
purchasers.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the Holocaust having ended more than sixty years ago, the repercussions of the acts of unlawfulness by the Nazi Party are still becoming
more and more prevalent today. 208 While original owners of Nazi-looted
artwork and their heirs may have been experiencing anguish from the loss
of treasured works of art for these past decades, only now, with the gradual
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unsealing of Nazi records detailing the locations of this loot, are many of
these families able to finally take a stand and pursue restitution. 209
However, the laws of the United States have not all been formulated
with the Holocaust in mind, and much of the relief offered to victims of the
Holocaust has not been sufficient. 210 The special circumstances of that era
call for special considerations in the law, and the application of civil forfeiture to Nazi-era restitution cases should be adopted as the standard.
Civil forfeiture can allow victims of Nazi looting to gain the relief they
deserve without the adoption of laws specific to Nazi-era restitution and
without ignoring the due process rights of the parties involved. 211 Up until
recently, the majority of Nazi-era restitution cases have been pursued as
either civil replevin actions or criminal actions under the National Stolen
Property Act. 212 Unfortunately, claimants in these cases have been barred
from restitution by roadblocks, such as the foreign affairs power, the international comity and act of state doctrines, statutes of limitation, and the
laches defense. 213
Unlike pure civil and criminal proceedings, civil forfeiture acts as a
hybrid of both and allows the original owners of looted artwork to pursue
restitution with the benefits of both civil and criminal law. 214 Like a civil
proceeding, civil forfeiture allows for a lower burden of proof than criminal
proceedings, 215 but, like a criminal proceeding, allows for older claims. 216
And, much like a criminal proceeding, civil forfeiture allows the claimants
of stolen artwork to bolster their cases with the abilities of the United States
government. 217
Despite criticisms from those uncomfortable with the benefits that civil forfeiture affords the victims of Nazi-era looting, with more support for
correcting the injustices suffered by the victims of the Holocaust, comes a
noticeable shift toward accepting civil forfeiture as the standard for restitution. 218 The issues with civil forfeiture’s creation of a new statutory limitation period for Nazi-era restitution claims are beginning to be met with an
understanding that allowing these claims to come forward is not contrary to
the purpose of a limiting period, 219 as well as the feeling that slight techni209.
210.
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calities can be overlooked in favor of granting ownership of stolen property
back to the victims of Nazi-looting. 220
It is also clear that the art market is becoming more concerned with
upholding the legitimacy of the art trade, rather than favoring illicit trade
over whatever slim effects restitution may have on the trade and lending of
art objects in both the market for purchase and the museum industry. 221
Furthermore, it is becoming clearer that the burdens originally thought to
have been imposed upon the bona fide purchasers of looted art are lightened
by the safeguards implemented by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 222
as well as the opportunities held by bona fide purchasers for ensuring good
title by undertaking a provenance investigation.223
With the lucrative and highly publicized settlement of Portrait of Wally, the art world has become more exposed to the benefits of civil forfeiture
as a means of gaining restitution of Nazi-looted artwork. 224 It seems that it
is only a matter of time before the true owners of looted artwork and their
advocates realize that civil forfeiture is the best alternative to traditional
civil and criminal proceedings in gaining restitution of treasured belongings.
PATRICIA K. RUIZ ∗
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